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Urbanization and inevitable migration

Crime and migrant workers

Jianhua Xu

Introduction

Crime is highly related to urbanization. On the one hand, modern society provides more opportunities for crime, such as more portable goods to be stolen, or more exposure to likely offenders as routine activities theory convincingly reveals (Cohen and Felson 1979). On the other hand, the breakdown of traditional norms during rapid social transition in the urbanization process also weakens social control on individuals and contributes to an increase of crime, as Durkheim's anomie theory powerfully explains (Durkheim 1933). In addition, a stranger society resulting from urbanization also changes people's tolerance and attitudes toward certain behaviors. An act regarded as undesirable but acceptable in a traditional society may become a crime in a stranger society. In its nature, crime is socially defined. But how much "unwanted" behavior will be defined as criminal is subject to a country's past history, political ideas, and willingness to look for solutions other than the penal ones. In this sense, Christie (2004) provocatively argues that "crime does not exist," only act does. Indeed, for the past 200 years, world history has demonstrated a clear pattern between urbanization and crime: both property crime and violent crime will increase in the initial stage of urbanization, but violent crime will decrease when the development of the urbanization process reaches a certain level (Shelley 1981). Although China is experiencing the most rapid and large-scale process of urbanization in world history, the exploration of crime problems related to urbanization remains in its infant stage. Research on the nexus of China's urbanization and crime is of particular significance, given that China has the largest population in the world and its urbanization process is taking place in such a short period of time.

In this chapter, I will first give a brief introduction to China's urbanization process and the formation of the migrant worker class. I will then examine the dominant discourse of migrant workers as crime offenders in urban China. This will be followed by exploring the victimization experience of migrant workers. I will further examine the Chinese government's policy in controlling migrant worker crime. Lastly, directions for future research will be discussed.

Rapid urbanization

When the Chinese Communist Party took over the control of the Chinese mainland in 1949, its urban population was as low as around 10 percent. In 1953, the first National Census data showed that only 12.3 percent of Chinese people lived in cities. There was a *de facto* de-urbanization period from the late 1950s to the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1977. As many as 17 million educated urban youth were sent to rural areas in the movement of "go to the mountainous and rural areas" (*shang shan xia xiang*) (Liu 2009). Mao's strategy of developing the third-line factories (*san xian gong chang*) in rural areas to prepare for war was also part of that story. Urbanization nearly stagnated in the two decades before the 1980s, with the percentage of urban population increasing slowly from 18.3 in 1964 to 21.2 in 1982 (see Figure 17.1).

After China started its reform and opening-up policy in the late 1970s, however, its urbanization process speeded up dramatically. In 1990, China's urban population reached 26.4 percent and the number increased again to 36.2 percent at the turn of new century. The urbanization has continued to grow after that. The sixth National Census data in 2010 indicated a new peak of urbanization level with 49.7 percent of Chinese people living in cities (see Figure 17.1). The year of 2011 further marked a milestone in China's history as for the first time China's urban population has surpassed its rural one with 690.79 million urbanites compared to 656.56 rural dwellers (Li and Chen 2012; Wines 2012). Internationally, China's urbanization level is just around the world average. What makes China particularly significant is the size of its overall population and the rapid urbanization process in the past three decades. Moreover, it is expected that China's urbanization will continue to grow with the urban population predicted to reach 60 percent in 2020 and 70 percent in 2050 (see Figure 17.1).

Hukou and influx of migrant workers

Although China has made great progress in urbanization in a short period of time, its urbanization has been widely regarded as "semi-urbanization," as hundreds of millions of migrant workers cannot enjoy full urban citizenship due to the household registration or *hukou* system (Pun and Lu 2010; C. Wang 2006). China's *hukou* system was launched in 1958 to control rural to urban migration and to reduce demographic pressures in cities caused by rapid socialist industrialization (Cheng and Selden 1994). The *hukou* system classified the Chinese population into two categories: those who have agricultural or rural status and those who have nonagricultural or urban status. Dramatic differences in rights and privileges exist between the two statuses and it is extremely difficult to convert from the rural to urban one (Wu and Treiman 2004). Due to restrictions of *hukou* and the related food ratio system in the era of planned economy, rural to urban migration was nearly impossible before the 1980s.

In the market reform period, the state's strategy to develop export-oriented industry created a huge demand for cheap labor from rural areas. With the relaxation of internal migration control, millions of former peasants moved to cities to look for jobs, which contributed greatly to China's economic miracle and successfully made it the workshop of the world (Amnesty International 2007; Pun 2005).

As shown in Figure 17.2, there were barely two million migrant workers throughout the country in 1980. It increased dramatically to 20 million in 1984, 50 million in 1988, 60 million in 1993, and 80 million in 1995. After that, the number of migrant workers continued to grow. It reached 110 million in 2000 and 140 million in 2004. At the end of 2011, China's migrant workers had reached 159 million. If we include 94 million local migrant workers (those who work in the towns near their rural *hukou* place), the overall number of migrant workers was as high as 253 million. Put another way, the number of current Chinese migrant workers is roughly equal to four times the UK population, two times the Japanese population, and the

Figure 17.1 China's urbanization level between 1953 and 2010
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2011); Service and Management Department for Floating Population of the State Commission for Population and Family Planning (2012: 4).


Figure 17.2 Number of migrant workers in China, 1980–2011
Sources: 1980–2004 data from Zhai and Duan (2006: 524); 2008–2011 data from National Bureau of Statistics of China (2012).

entire U.S. population. It is predicted that, in the next three decades, there will be 300 million more migrant workers in China (Service and Management Department for Migrant Population of the State Commission for Population and Family Planning 2011: 1).

Although millions of migrant workers have been working and living in cities for many years, they are collectively and systematically discriminated against as they cannot get a local *hukou*, which disqualifies them from receiving social welfare such as housing, medical care, children's education, pensions, and many other privileges to which urban residents are entitled. They are second-class citizens and even treated as foreigners within the cities of their own country (Solinger 1999). In recent years, minor reforms of the *hukou* system have been implemented, but its fundamental function of restricting population mobility and access to state-sponsored benefits remains unchanged (Chan and Buckingham 2008; Chan and Zhang 1999; F.-L. Wang 2004).

Crime and migrant workers

Modernity has another face (Bauman 1993, 2004), and China's modernization is no exception. Along with China's economic miracle and rapid urbanization comes its rising crime problem. Indeed, pre-reform China has been regarded as a "crime-free" society (Fairbank 1986). Since the 1980s, however, China's crime rate has increased dramatically in both violent crime and property crime (Cao and Dai 2001; Liu 2005). In particular, crime in large metropolises grew much faster than that in other parts of the country (Z. Wang 2006). The influx of millions of migrant workers has been viewed as the main reason for the increasing crime problem, as police statistics showed that they were responsible for the majority of offenses in urban China. In present-day urban China, crime is almost synonymous with migrant worker crime.

Migrant workers as offenders

In the pre-reform period, since internal migration was strictly restricted, migrant worker crime was not a problem in urban China. With the arrival of migrant workers caused by economic reform, the concern about migrant worker crime appeared at the same time. This problem first emerged in southern China as this area was the frontier of China's reform due to its geographic proximity to Hong Kong. The establishment of Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou as Special Economic Zones in 1980 made Guangdong the most vibrant province in the 1980s. Motivated by slogans such as "to be rich is glorious" and "east, west, south, north and center, getting rich in Guangdong" (*dong xi nan bei zhong, fa cai dao guangdong*), more and more migrant workers arrived at the Pearl River Delta in search of work and wealth. They became the first generation of Chinese migrant workers. Some of them found jobs, while others lost their way. Those without stable jobs were regarded as "floating blind" (*mangliu*), a rather discriminative title given by local people. They gradually became a new, mobile and dangerous criminal class in local people's minds (Dutton 2005: 194).

In Guangzhou, for instance, 107 migrant workers accounted for 2.2 percent of all police arrests in 1979 (see Table 17.1). A decade later, the number of arrested migrant workers skyrocketed to 5,703, constituting 58 percent of police arrests in 1988 (Liao and Liu 1997: 497). Since 1992, more than two-thirds of offenders were migrant workers. It further increased to over 80 percent in 1997, and reached its new peak of over 90 percent in 2000 (Table 17.1). In 2001, more than 30,000 migrant workers were arrested for crime in Guangzhou, representing 1 percent of the entire migrant population (Guangzhou Public Security Bureau 2003: 167). As shown in Table 17.1, Shanghai's problem of migrant worker crime was also astonishing, although it came nearly a decade later than Guangzhou. In 1998, 59 percent of police arrests

Table 17.1 Percentage of migrant workers in police arrests in selected cities, 1979–2007

Year	Guangzhou	Shanghai	Shenyang	Xiamen	Chengdu	Wuxi	Zhangjiagang
1979	2						
1988	58						
1991	63	39	33	51	26	31	22
1992	67	45	25	55	25	34	21
1993	69	54	25	59	17	35	28
1994	71	58	30	61	42	41	31
1995	74	56	33	66	43	39	33
1996	73	56	32	68	45	44	32
1997	81	59	39	74	47	45	34
1998	85	59	37	72	57	51	43
1999	87	55	38	79	61	51	45
2000	91	51	45	77	56	55	47
2001		50					
2002		52					
2003		60					
2004		66					
2005		70					
2006		73					
2007		76					

Sources: Guangzhou data in 1979 and 1988: Liao and Liu (1997: 496); data for 1991–2000: Wang (2002: 159); data for Shanghai 2001–2007: Xu (2008: 15–16).

were migrant workers in Shanghai, roughly the same level as that of Guangzhou in 1988. In 2007, Shanghai's migrant workers accounted for 76 percent of the total crime in the city, nearly the same level as that as Guangzhou in 1997 (81 percent) (see Table 17.1). Guangzhou and Shanghai were different in crime involving migrant workers partially because Guangzhou started its economic reform earlier and its migrant workers were less educated than those in Shanghai (Wan and Liu 2007).

As with the same situation in other cities, the increase of crime in Shanghai was due mainly to the rise of crime committed by migrant workers. From 1990 to 2007, police arrests of Shanghai local people remained fairly stable, with 10,000 to 15,000 suspects every year, but the arrests of migrant workers increased fivefold from 6,690 in 1990 to 40,979 in 2007 (see Figure 17.3). Crimes by migrant workers in other inland cities, such as Shenyang, Chengdu and Zhangjiajie, also increased but the problem was less serious than that in coastal cities. To a large extent, this difference lay in the fact that there were fewer migrant workers in these inland cities, as they were comparatively less developed. In general, police statistics have shown the dominance of migrant workers in criminal activity in urban China.

A good indicator that migrant workers comprise the majority of offenders is the yearly crime drop during Chinese New Year (CNY), usually in February. More often than not, Chinese migrant workers' parents and children are left behind in rural areas. During the CNY break, these migrant workers will return to their hometowns for family reunions, then go back to cities to look for jobs again after the holidays. The absence of migrant workers in this period witnesses

Figure 17.3 Police arrests in criminal cases in Shanghai, 1990–2007
Source: Xu (2008: 15–16).

Figure 17.4 Weekly crime cases from police hotline in Guangzhou, 2005/12/26–2007/04/06
Source: Zhang (2007: 44).

a sharp decline in crime in cities. For example, in Guangzhou, weekly crime cases decreased from roughly 50,000 before CNY to its lowest point of roughly 30,000 during CNY in 2006. There was a nearly 40 percent decline when migrant workers went back to their hometowns for CNY. The same pattern occurred again in 2007 CNY (see Figure 17.4).[1]

Although the degree of migrant worker crime varies across cities, a general rule is that the problem is more serious in large cities than in medium-sized ones, as more migrant workers are attracted to metropolises by their economic opportunities for realizing their Chinese dreams of getting rich (Yan 1994). National police data[2] showed that crime committed by migrant workers was around 32 percent in 2000 (Wang 2002: 49), and this rate was roughly 50 percent in medium-sized cities such as Wuxi and Chengdu, and was as high as over 80 and even 90 percent in big cities, such as Guangzhou and Shenzhen.

Migrant workers as victims

It is a truism that migrant workers constitute the majority of offenders and form a dangerous criminal class in urban China. One police scholar argued that, in China, in 2000, 32 percent of all arrested suspects were migrant workers. However, migrant workers only accounted for 8.5 percent of the entire population. In other words, migrant workers were six times more likely than local people to commit crime (D. Wang 2004). This phenomenon is further strengthened by sensational reports in the mass media. Academic research in China also tends to focus on the offender part of migrant worker crime and tries to provide suggestions for the police on how to solve this problem. In Manning's (2010) words, it is sociology *for*, rather than *of*, the police. Criminological knowledge remains largely administrative criminology in China. A critical discourse on the victim's part is generally absent. However, international victimization

research has shown that offenders and victims are more likely to share the same background (Rock 1998). For example, in the U.S., African Americans are over-represented in both offenders and victims compared to their White counterparts (Hindelang *et al.* 1978). This finding can also be applied to Chinese migrant workers. This is particularly the case in violent crime, which requires interpersonal confrontation.

In their study of crime in a medium-sized city of TZ (a pseudonym) located in the Pearl River Delta area, Xu and Song (2005) found that migrant workers were more likely than local residents to be victims of violent crime. In TZ, migrant workers constituted 40 percent of its two million residents, but made up 61 percent of robbery victims, 73 percent of homicide victims, 85 percent of assault victims, and 92 percent of rape victims in 2004. Given that migrant workers are less likely than local people to report their cases to the police (Human Rights Watch 2012), the actual victimization rate of migrant workers is likely to be even higher. Although migrant workers' risk of being robbed is relatively lower than other types of violent crime, their risk of victimization is extremely high for certain types of robbery. For instance, although migrant workers and local people shared virtually the same proportion (52 vs. 48 percent) among motorcycle taxi drivers in TZ in 2006, the vast majority (93 percent) of victims of taxi driver robbery were migrant workers. Put another way, the rate of robbery victimization for migrant workers was 12 times greater than that of local drivers (Xu 2009).

There are many reasons for the convergence of both offenders and victims among migrant workers in violent crime. One explanation is related to the nature of violent crime, which requires the co-presence of the offender and victim when it occurs. In urban China, migrant workers are more likely to interact with other migrant workers than with local people, both in their work and everyday life (Pun 2007). Since the majority of violent crime offenders are

migrant workers, the high risk of violent victimization for migrant workers is a by-product of their intra-group contact, which is similar to intra-racial violence in the U.S. noted by macro-structural opportunity theory (Blau 1977).

Actually, the stereotype of migrant workers as a dangerous or criminal class is also strengthened by routine and high-profile police crackdowns on migrant worker crime. After the first nationwide "strike-hard" campaign (*yanda*), which focused on juvenile crime, the subsequent *yanda* campaigns shifted their focuses to migrant worker crime (Dutton and Xu 2005: 127; Trevaskes 2010). In urban China, an emphasis on the potential criminal offending among migrant workers is also conveyed to the public regularly in their everyday life. For instance, numerous crime prevention posters and banners were used on the street in Guangzhou. They were particularly popular in "urban villages" where an overwhelming majority of dwellers were migrant workers. While the deterrent effect of these posters and banners on crime is unclear, it did highlight the impression of social disorder in these places (Xu forthcoming). As shown in Figure 17.5, some posters made it explicitly clear that migrant workers are potential offenders in the eyes of police officers.

Controlling migrant worker crime

Since the economic reform, migrant workers have been increasingly regarded as a threat to urban dwellers, and more and more made the scapegoat for all of China's crime problems, a process that is similar to reactions against vagrants during the Industrial Revolution in Britain

Figure 17.5 A banner on a Guangzhou street reads: "Sincerely strengthen the management of rented houses and migrant workers, strike hard on burglary"
Source: Photo taken by author, April 1, 2012.

(Bakken 2005: 9). The heavy involvement of migrant workers in criminal activity has posed a great threat to social stability, which could not be adequately addressed using the traditional system of social control (Curran 1998).

In response, Chinese police widely resorted to the Shelter and Investigation (*shou rong shen cha*) policy before the mid-1990s, which allowed them to detain any suspect for no more than three months even if they did not have enough evidence to prove their offense. But the calculation of three months only began when the detainee's name and address were identified. As a result, many detainees suffered from prolonged detention, and some were even detained for up to five years, during which nothing was done to solve their cases (Dutton and Xu 2005: 128). As this policy enabled the police to detain "unwanted" people for a long period of time without judicial approval, it was widely used to solve the newly emerged crime problem involved in migrant workers. Many migrant workers were detained for minor offenses before this policy was abolished in 1996, largely due to international pressure on severe human rights violations.

However, the problem of migrant worker crime persists and the police have to find alternative solutions. As Bakken (2005: 2) argues, until recently, the task of the Chinese police was to "police the norm" rather than the law. Their power comes from that task instead of abstract law. Another powerful tool used by the Chinese police was the Detention and Repatriation (*shou rong qian song*) policy, which allowed them to detain and repatriate migrant workers to their original *hukou* places. In 1982, the *Detention and Repatriation Regulation of City Vagrants and Beggars* was put into practice. Its initial purpose was to provide social welfare to vagrants and beggars by educating them and sending them back home. Nevertheless, the police quickly extended their power to detain migrant workers who did not have legal documents, residence and source of income. In other words, migrant workers must produce their identification card, temporary residential permit, and work permit to the police upon being checked. Otherwise, they would be treated as "three-withouts" and subjected to detention and repatriation. In China, according to the *Provisional Regulations on the Management of Temporary Residents in the Urban Areas* issued in 1985, any person staying or living outside of their *hukou* place for more than three days must apply for a temporary residential permit.[3] For migrant workers, they also needed to apply for a work permit. However, obtaining these documents was not only time-consuming, but also costly. As a result, the majority of migrant workers lived in cities illegally (Amnesty International 2007), and were subjected to police arrest for detention and repatriation.

Figure 17.6 shows that, in Shanghai, approximately 10,000 migrant workers were arrested for detention and repatriation in 1988, and this number increased 10 times to 100,000 in 1997. In Guangzhou, this number remained at a relatively stable level of 40,000 to 50,000 in early 1990s, but rose dramatically after 1996 to its peak of 180,000 in 2001.

In summarizing their successful experience in managing crime, Guangzhou police proudly announced that:

> We established specialized police detention institutions, provided cars exclusively for detention purpose, built detention and repatriation centers, and extensively detained and deported "three-withouts" people. In 2011, we detained more than 180,000 people, and 89 per cent of them were sent to their hometowns, which greatly reduced public security pressure, and cleaned up social environment.
>
> *Guangzhou Public Security Bureau 2003: 162*

However, with the increasing rights consciousness in Chinese society (Li 2010), the Detention and Repatriation policy was widely criticized for its abuse of human rights.[4] Some scholars

Figure 17.6 Migrant workers arrested for Detention and Repatriation in Guangzhou and Shanghai, 1988–2001
Sources: Guangzhou 1991–95: Liao and Liu (1997); Guangzhou Public Security Bureau (2001); Shanghai data: Zhao and Kipnis (2000).

argued that the policy violated China's Constitution, which guaranteed people's freedom of migration. In 2003, the Sun Zhigang case became the last straw. Sun was a 27-year-old university graduate, fashion designer, and migrant worker from Hubei Province. He was arrested by Guangzhou police for not being able to produce his temporary residential permit for Detention and Repatriation. Later, his friend brought Sun's ID card to the police, but they refused to release him. Three days later, he was beaten to death in a detention center by other detainees (Li 2003; Yuan 2003). This case caused an outcry about how migrant workers were treated in urban China. Later that year, the notorious Detention and Repatriation policy was abolished under public pressure (Huang 2012).

In a nutshell, migrant workers generally face a discriminative environment in urban China. The primary tasks of urban policy toward them are "to collect fees, to issue permits, to supervise them through public security organs, and to detain and deport them back to the countryside when their labor is not needed" (Zhao and Kipnis 2000). Although, in recent years, there have been minor changes in practice toward migrant workers, a "drive-away policing" strategy still prevails (Xu 2012).

Future research

The British Industrial Revolution nurtured the development of Sociology as a discipline, and urbanization and migration in Chicago city provided the ground for the formation of the Chicago School. As the most populous country and the second-largest economy in the world, China's rapid urbanization also provides unprecedented opportunities for scholars to accumulate knowledge and develop theories. However, criminology in general and crime related to migrant

workers in particular remain underdeveloped both within China and internationally. There are several potential promising areas for research about crime and migrant workers in China.

First, China's urbanization has reached its landmark of over 50 percent. What does this mean in terms of crime? In recent years, official police statistics have shown that, although overall crime numbers continue to grow, the number of violent crimes has been decreasing since 2001. Is China experiencing a change in its crime pattern as predicted by modernization theory (Shelley 1981)? Or will China's crime pattern be different from Western societies, as its unique *hukou* system has made Chinese migrant workers' urbanization semi-urbanization? A comprehensive examination of the relationship between different types of crime and China's urbanization process will undoubtedly enrich our understanding of the current crime situation in China and its position in a global context.

Second, China's rapid urbanization has caused the formation of many urban villages, which are surrounded by modern skyscrapers in large cities such as Shenzhen, Guangzhou and Beijing (Siu 2007). The overwhelming majority of residents in these urban villages are migrant workers, and these places become hotspots of crime in urban China. In the words of Chinese police, they are a center of "prostitution, gambling and drugs." However, for migrant workers, urban villages provide both work opportunities and living places (Song *et al.* 2008). Much of Chicago School's work is based on the study of crime in urban communities. An in-depth ethnography work about crime and its control in urban villages will be of significance to the literature on neighborhood effects and crime.

Third, more often than not, migrant workers in China are perceived as potential criminals. Their victimization is often neglected. Given the Chinese government's conservative attitudes toward criminological research and difficulties in obtaining reliable data, studying victimization of migrant workers might have its practical advantage in understanding their experience. The successful Tianjin research provides a good example in this regard (Messner *et al.* 2007; Zhang *et al.* 2007) (see also Chapters 11 and 14), but the Tianjin survey generally excluded migrant workers. A scientifically designed survey to compare victimization between migrant workers and local residents will contribute greatly to the literature of crime, migration, and class.

Conclusion

Durkheim once argued that crime is "normal" as it is omnipresent in any society across time and space (1938: 98). Bauman goes further to argue that crime is not only "normal," but also "inevitable," as long as access to hallowed/coveted values (i.e., the distribution of means to obtain them) remains unequal. But values would cease to be hallowed/coveted (i.e., cease to be values) if that access were equal to all (Daems and Robert 2007). However, one cannot deny the fact that the crime rate in any given society varies across time, and that urbanization is an important factor causing these variations.

China's rapid urbanization in the past three decades has been accompanied by a dramatic increase of crime rate. Migrant workers are quickly identified as the primary source of the rising crime problem despite the fact that widening social inequality is the structural reason for their crime (Cao and Dai 2001). In official discourse, migrant workers have become a dangerous criminal class in urban China.

However, the fear of migrant worker crime might be overblown. First, there is a tendency in criminology to describe working-class crime as the dominant form of criminal behavior (Young 2011: 79), and this is particularly the case in authoritarian China. Nevertheless, the rampant corruption, abuse of power and white-collar crime committed by government officials and urban citizens are not only under-reported in police statistics, but also often out of the reach

of criminology research. Second, migrant workers' role as offenders is particularly highlighted, while their victimization experience is severely neglected. Victimization research has long revealed that offenders and victims are likely to share similar background. This is also the case for Chinese migrant workers, who are much more likely than local residents to become victims. Third, the Chinese government's policy toward migrant workers is quite hostile. They have suffered from multi-dimensional social exclusion and become second-class citizens in urban China (Xu 2010). Although minor reform has been implemented in recent years, *hukou* still plays its main function to prevent migrant workers from settling down in the city. Ironically, Chinese *hukou*, a system designed for social control, has now become a system that contributes to the increase, rather than the decrease, of crime in urban China. Its impact on crime might remain intact unless the discriminative policy is abolished completely in the future.

Notes

1 This number is from the municipal police hotline record, which is dramatically different from the registered cases in the police department.
2 In addition to all the problems shared with Western official crime data, one unique aspect of Chinese data is worth mentioning. China is a "*guanxi*" society, which means, if a child or youth has deep roots in a place, it is less likely that his/her criminal behavior will show up in the police records. His/her friends and parents and relatives might invite key police officers for a dinner or resort to other ways to bribe them in order to eliminate their criminal records. In contrast, a rural migrant worker who does the same thing will show up in the police records because he/she is in a "stranger society." This is one reason why official data show such a high rate of migrant worker crime.
3 In March 2001, the first time I went to Guangzhou for the admission interview of my Master study in Sun Yat-sen University, I worried whether I would be arrested for Detention and Repatriation since I did not apply for a temporary residential permit. The fear came from numerous stories I read in newspapers and my rural relatives' and friends' experience of detention and deportation in cities.
4 In some cases, the police can even tear migrant workers' documents into pieces and then regard them as "three-withouts" during certain campaigns.

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