

The Politics of Controlling Organized Crime in Greater China, by Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo. New York: Routledge, 2016. xviii+253 pp. US\$160.00 (cloth).

Mainly using data gathered from newspaper reports from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, this book explores how governments in Greater China deal with organized crime and whether they have the capacity to control organized crime. The book also discusses to what extent their practices in controlling organized crime affect the legitimacy of these regimes.

The book largely focuses on four types of organized crime: terrorism, prostitution, gambling, and drugs. It argues that while the central government in China has a strong will to constrain organized crime, the corruption and “protection umbrellas” of local government officials enable organized criminals to penetrate local politics. To some extent local states have therefore lost their autonomy in controlling organized crime. In Taiwan, “black gold” politics can be traced back to the Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo eras, when organized criminals were used as a tool of the intelligence and security apparatus to monitor and suppress political dissidents. Because of the legacy of a symbiotic relationship between organized crime and politics, the current Taiwan government loses its autonomy in controlling organized criminals because the latter are actively involved in local elections, money politics, and corruption. In Hong Kong, the Triads were traditionally strong and the colonial state weak in controlling organized crime. However, after the establishment of the Independent Commission Against Corruption in the 1970s, the Hong Kong police have become efficient in controlling organized crime, and the judiciary system is less affected by money politics, even though a criminal-political nexus exists at local levels. Organized crime in Macau was once rampant in the late 1990s when the colonial government was weak. After the handover in 1999, Macau became a much stronger developmental city-state and organized crime held a low profile, while at the same time profiteering from the booming casino industry.

The book also examines how China and Taiwan and the city-states of Hong Kong and Macau cooperate with each other and with the international community to fight organized crime. The author, Sonny Lo, argues that both the capacity and autonomy of governments in Greater China in fighting against organized crime have been improved through regional and international cooperation.

Citing updated cases such as the Zhou Yongkang corruption case in China and the high-profile antiprostitution campaign vis-à-vis Hotel Lisboa in Macau, the book provides a timely description of the current situation of organized crime and how different governments in Greater China deal with the problem. The book also covers some less known but interesting cases relating to the tension in controlling organized crime within Greater China. The tension between Hong Kong and Macau on the Hong Kong Casino cruise ship case is one example. The tension between China

and Taiwan on the possible legalization of casinos in Kinmen and Matsu is another. Several issues deserve further elaboration and discussion.

The book focuses particularly on examining the politics of controlling organized crime in China. It argues that because of the corruption of local governments, the central government has to rely on campaigns to crack down on organized crime and rein in local governments. While such an interpretation has some validity, it ignores the fact that anti-organized crime campaigns can also be used by ambitious local politicians in order to augment their power. One such example was the anti-organized crime campaign in Chongqing led before 2012 by the currently imprisoned former Chongqing Party chief and princeling Bo Xilai. The general observation that the central government is strong and the local governments are weak in China is not convincing and needs more evidence.

The book places strong confidence in the central Chinese government while regarding local governments as the main problem: “in the PRC, some local states . . . were even captured by organized crime, while the central government remains relatively incorrupt and independent” (234), “in the minds of dedicated reformers like President Xi, who are keen to eliminate corrupt officials” (232). Xi is mentioned over 20 times for his role in combating organized crime. The book’s focus leaves other institutional means of controlling organized crime unexamined. For instance, an independent judicial system and freedom of expression are two important mechanisms preventing corruption and the formation of symbiotic relations between power and organized crime.

While the book argues that the capacity of all of the states in Greater China has increased through cross-border and international cooperation, some controversial issues deserve further elaboration. For instance, China’s “fox hunting” operations overseas to arrest wanted corrupt government officials have caused much concern internationally. The recent case of the Causeway Bay Bookstore in Hong Kong, where several Hong Kong citizens are alleged to have been kidnapped by Chinese authorities and transported to China for selling politically sensitive books, also raises concerns about cross-border law enforcement and violation of the “one country, two systems” policy in Hong Kong.

While the first and last chapters address the concepts of regime capacity, autonomy, and legitimacy directly, these remain underdeveloped and loosely related in other chapters. In particular, regime types across Greater China vary dramatically from democratic Taiwan to authoritarian China, with Hong Kong and Macau somewhere in between. An important unanswered question is how these different regime types influence the politics of controlling organized crime in Greater China, especially as the different regimes rest on different sources of political legitimacy.

The book could also have been more reader friendly if it had gone through a more careful editing (e.g., August 2004, not 204 [113]; Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997, not 1977 [216]; and it contains many wrongly spelled Chinese

names of people and places). A critical evaluation of newspaper sources and official government pronouncements would have added more balance.

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Faked in China: Nation Branding, Counterfeit Culture, and Globalization, by Fan Yang. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2016. ix+284 pp. US\$30.00 (paper).

In the two decades since the publication of William Alford's agenda-setting *To Steal A Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization* (1995), no fewer than a dozen books have been written by journalists, legal practitioners, and scholars focusing on the weak protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) in China. These studies have engaged with the general puzzle of why IPR violations persist. They mostly have analyzed copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting, though some have examined patent infringement as well. The answers to what drives the persistence of piracy have varied: some have emphasized cultural factors; others have stressed the profits from piracy; and still others have highlighted the low quality of the courts and bureaucracies engaged with the enforcement of IPR laws. Despite their different foci and regardless of whether they believe that piracy reflects the unwillingness or the inability of the Chinese state to enforce the relevant laws and regulations, existing studies share an understanding that IPR violations are not desirable. Fan Yang's *Faked in China* offers a fresh perspective that contradicts this basic premise.

The book analyzes the tension between the persistence of counterfeiting and the efforts of the Chinese state to create a new image for China following its entry into the World Trade Organization. Aware that "made in China" was understood as a signifier of low-quality products that were also often counterfeit, the state began a "created in China" rebranding campaign that aimed to reposition China from a pirate to a creator of IPR. These state-led efforts were on display in the lead-up to the 2008 Olympics but have become even more intense in the wake of the global financial crisis. They are evidenced by new indigenous innovation requirements for goods produced in China over the last decade and by a number of incentives that aim to reward copyrighted Chinese goods, inventors of patents, and developers of trademarks. And yet, as Yang persuasively argues, this nation-branding project has failed to rein in a vibrant counterfeiting culture. The book offers an engaging theoretical discussion of grassroots resistance to the global IPR regime and to state-sponsored efforts to promote a new national brand.